People watch as plumes of smoke rise up from buildings on South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island after North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds. (Photo: Reuters)
If I were slightly more egocentric, I would suspect that Kim Jong Il always waits until I travel abroad to do something spectacular, finding sinister pleasure in my desperate attempts to keep up with the course of events and urgent requests for comments. I suppose reality is a bit more complex.
Sometimes, one can’t help but ask: Do they want to kill themselves? Among most experts, at least those who deserve this description, there is broad agreement that North Korea is a rational actor in the sense that its actions serve a predefined purpose. Whether Pyongyang’s assessment of the effects of its actions is always correct and realistic is another matter. However, even in this regard, North Korea is anything but unique. Misperceptions are based on asymmetrical and incomplete information and hence part of everyday life.
So if a suicidal attempt can most likely be excluded, what did North Korea want to achieve by firing on South Koreans on November 23? This may only come to light in hindsight. For now, we can simply make another educated guess.
It is no secret that North Korea has lots of problems and interests. The economy is in very bad shape—the result of decades of inefficient socialist economic order, misguided economic policies, and massive international sanctions. The latter are a consequence of Pyongyang’s foreign policy that builds on aggression and puts the country in a kind of permanent state of war. The resulting siege mentality allows the leadership, to a certain degree, to argue domestically for a primacy of politics over the economy. In this context, regularly occurring military provocations are part of a strategy to maintain regime security. This strategy is risky, but has been successful thus far. And there is no better argument than success.
Considering that South Korea is still on top of the North’s foreign policy agenda, we can also draw a connection between the artillery shelling and the G-20 Summit that took place in Seoul just over a week ago. South Korea received international recognition, even a leadership role, which clearly annoyed North Korea. Pyongyang, with its not unrealistic fear of absorption in the case of unification, refuses to accept that the once poor and underdeveloped South has become a globally respected, vibrant democracy and dynamic market economy. North Korea was smart enough not to start its provocation during the summit; this would have affronted its vital supporter, China. And despite what its public image and many of its actions may suggest, North Korea is actually very concerned about its international image. Offending the “fascist puppets” in Seoul is one thing; provoking all G-20 members at once is another. This concern is also reflected in the instant claim that the South fired first.
We should also not forget about the internal processes that became visible during the Party conference in September—the first to occur in 44 years. North Korea is going through a process of power restructuring, possibly also of power transfer. We have limited insight into the internal dynamics, but common sense suggests that any change, anywhere, is prone to risk. North Korea is no different. In a way, it is even more vulnerable, as such changes take place rarely and arbitrarily—unlike a democracy where the leadership changes regularly. The Korean Workers’ Party as a central power institution has been strengthened significantly, and the rule of Kim Jong Il’s family has been reemphasized by providing top positions to his son, his sister, his brother-in-law and other relatives. Now the task is to create legitimacy for the new leadership. Being a relative might provide an entry ticket; but to remain in power, there must be achievements. A resolute answer to an actual or alleged South Korean provocation would fall into this category.
There is also the possibility of more or less openly expressed doubts among the elite and the people about the correctness of the September decisions. In that case, the latest incident would be an expression of the century-old practice to divert attention away from domestic issues by raising tensions externally.
Those who give North Koreans the credit of strategic thinking ability will also see a connection between November 23 and the visit by Sigfried Hecker to Yongbyon on November 12. The nuclear expert was shown facilities that strongly suggest the existence of a highly enriched uranium program in North Korea—one that is surprisingly well developed. Now, this is of course not an accidental observation. Hecker became, unintentionally, the messenger of Pyongyang. Here is the message: We finally want to achieve results in our relations with the United States. On North Korea’s wish list are economic aid, the end of sanctions, access to international finance and trade, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Washington, recognition as a nuclear power, and a peace treaty to end the Korean War. The latter would include some financial compensation.
Against this backdrop, the incident on November 23 looks like an attempt to exclude Seoul from possible negotiations. After such a grave incident, it is impossible for President Lee Myung Bak to sit at the same table with North Korea. Domestic sentiment against such appeasement is too strong. And even if he manages to swallow his pride, North Korea can and will repeat the argument that the South fired first and hence as the aggressor, is not qualified as a dialogue partner. In the eyes of Pyongyang, Japan lost this status long ago. What remains then, are the long aspired quasi-bilateral talks with the United States, represented by a weakened President Obama and supported by Beijing. China would in that case be regarded by North Korea as an ally, which is not necessarily a misperception. And clearly, Beijing’s interest in finding a solution to this permanent crisis has just grown.
As it is impossible to see any overseas interest of North Korea being advanced by the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, it seems more likely than not that the incident was wholly driven by domestic interests.
You suggest that it may be “an attempt to exclude Seoul from possible negotiations”. It also has the effect of excluding Washington which means that Pyongyang, assuming they want to negotiate, has no one to negotiate with.
What I find interesting is the question of winners and losers. China, after an aggressive reaction to a border dispute with Japan, appears meek as a kitten in its ‘Why can’t we all be friends’ response to the Yeonpyeong Island incident. Did North Korea seek this result? If so why?
Until now the US has refrained from exercising its carrier strike groups in the Yellow Sea out of regard for Chinese sensibilities. No any more. Another one for the Chinese loss column. I would argue that only the South Korean military and intelligence establishment has lost more than China because of this incident.
Winners? Team USA. Not only are they exercising their carriers in the Yellow Sea but I suggest that everyone in Asia -except most notably China- are glad to see them there.
North Korean leaders also seem to send a following message to their own people and the world: we are strong and victorious. More than a year ago I heard from a well-placed North Korean that although there will be no winners in an all-out war, in a local conflict North Korean army would surely win. The Yellow sea was mentioned in the context, so this incident is not that unexpected, although I do not believe Yeonpyondo shelling was a calculated attack- rather an overreaction. South Korea’s sabre ratlling plays therefore exactly into the hands of these most hardline elements of North Korean leadership, for whom a “small victoriuos war” (that they believe a local conflict in the DMZ-NLL area, involving maybe several thousdands casualties, would be) is a blessing to enhance their control over the country.
Great thanks for this detailed explanation of the recent events from my side, too.
I slightly disagree though that North Korea hopes to gain access to bilateral talks with the United States (or even to finalize a peace agreement) by shelling the South.
Rather we should look at the interplay of domestic and geo-politics.
The Lee government has starved the North of aid which it desperately needs. Hence, Pyongyang is hoping to profit from yet another round of economic and political appeasement from the South.
The patron-client relationships in the North, with leadership change become more feasible then ever, need to be greased and maintained. Where to take the cash from though? Aid flows from the South (which are sent with the aim to tame the naughty Northern neighbour) might just come in handy.
Secondly, what really interests me are policy choices open to South Korea. Understanding the North’s action as rationale is clearly helpful. How can the South then use this knowledge to develop effective policy? Send money (although then it would play the North’s little dirty game), show strength (the current option) or even retaliate? I would be very much interested in hearing more about that.
Great thanks for this detailed explanation of the recent events from my side, too.
I slightly disagree though that North Korea hopes to gain access to bilateral talks with the United States (or even to finalize a peace agreement) by shelling the South.
Rather we should look at the interplay of domestic and geo-politics.
The Lee government has starved the North of aid which it desperately needs. Hence, Pyongyang is hoping to profit from yet another round of economic and political appeasement from the South by shelling the islands, therefore financing the North’s regime during the unstable times of leadership change. The patron-client relationships in the North, with regime change become more feasible then ever, need to be greased and maintained. Where to take the cash from though?
Secondly, what really interests me are policy choices open to South Korea. Understanding the North’s action as rationale is clearly helpful. How can the South then use this knowledge to develop effective policy? Send money (although then it would play the North’s little dirty game), show strength (the current option) or even retaliate? I would be very much interested in hearing more about that.
[...] further and perhaps more substantial musings on the shelling can be found at 38 North by the excellent Ruediger [...]
Thankyou for that assessment. It is very thought provoking.
The question everyone will be asking is; where to from here?
The US will not be interested in any negotiations until there are clear actions by the DPRK which would be demonstrative of a reconcilliatory attitude.
The DPRK is unlikely to take any such action considering it could be domestically interpreted as a sign of weakness. This is particularly true given the propaganda it’s populace would have recently digested regarding the current tensions.
What may further complicate matters is the issue of family ties between the people of the North and South. These relationships are largely only a reality to the North and South’s senior citizens. As this generation passes on there is little bonding the two nations apart from the DPRK’s perpetuated ideology of reunification.
Hopefully recent tensions are largely related to the dynastic family’s power transfer and in due course will cool.
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by DPRK News Line, Mungo's Milintel. Mungo's Milintel said: Suicidal, Calculating, or Constrained? Yeonpyeong Island and North Korea’s Motives http://ow.ly/3gU1X [...]