By John Feffer
23 June 2010
Roberta Cohen and I, along with most observers of North Korea, agree on the details of the human rights situation. We differ on strategies to address the abysmal state of affairs.
But we don’t differ quite as much as Roberta suggests in her article Human Rights: A Means of Engaging North Korea. I don’t, for instance, suggest “setting aside” human rights in engaging North Korea. Indeed, my article was devoted to precisely the challenge of incorporating a human rights perspective in a way that can be effective—i.e., actually improving the living conditions of real, existing North Koreans.
So, for instance, I don’t reject the “name and shame” approach. In fact, I highlight its many virtues. I simply point out the obvious: it hasn’t been effective in improving the daily lives of North Koreans. I would hope that at some point such an approach would achieve its intended results. And I think that organizations that engage in such activities should continue to do so—since it is difficult to know with any great certainty the relationship between what we say and do outside of North Korea and what happens inside the country.
Nor do I reject the humanitarian approach. I write that North Korea has been leery of the humanitarian approach because it fosters a certain dependence (a criticism not unknown within the development community as well). In fact, the cornerstone of the human security approach is the satisfaction of basic human needs—but within a larger development framework.
Nor do I describe human rights as a “punitive” approach that doubles as a “hasten-the-collapse” strategy. There are certainly some actors who use human rights as a regime-change tactic; but I don’t in my article or anywhere else argue that the human rights community as a whole embraces this perspective.
Nor do I “excuse” North Korea from respecting civil and political rights. I am well aware of the UN covenants to which North Korea is a party, and I’ve written about the prospects of engaging North Korea on those issues elsewhere. The examples that Roberta cites in her article—movement forward on disability issues or on reproductive health—did not result from “name and shame” tactics but from serious engagement with North Korean officials who were responsive and concerned.
I’ll now turn to her critique of what I do say, namely that a human security approach has a more reasonable chance of success in producing a more humane society in North Korea. Roberta writes, “Proposing development assistance for North Korea, however, assumes that the North Korean government is committed to the economic betterment of its population and that the aid will advance this goal.” Actually, the North Korean government is neither the virtuous cadre of North Korean propaganda nor the unified evil force of Roberta’s imagination. The North Korean government consists of many levels and many actors, and they often work at cross-purposes to one another.
Roberta in fact acknowledges this complexity when she refers to economic reform in the country. Obviously this reform had to originate from somewhere within the system. There are government officials in North Korea who want to revive the manufacturing and agricultural capabilities of the country and recognize that a starving population is unacceptable from both a moral and a national security standpoint. Yes, of course, economic reform has encountered resistance within the country. That is a basic truth about economic reform in every country (Republican resistance to the stimulus package in this country is only one recent example). But to treat the North Korean government as a unitary actor with a single mind is an analytical mistake.
Roberta goes on to dismiss development aid because of the possibility that the regime will not use it for constructive purposes. She quotes the example of a fertilizer plant being used, possibly, for the making of explosives. Perhaps, though she cites no evidence. But what about an irrigation system? A rural sustainable energy program? A TB clinic? A soybean farm? Such development projects are not easily repurposed. Yes, I can understand the dual-use character of sophisticated computers. But I don’t see how the government will use clean water or soybeans for nefarious purposes. Will it divert a portion of humanitarian aid to the elite or the military? Perhaps. But should our response then be to provide nothing at all, and let people starve? Even defectors who have no particular love for the regime recommend the provision of humanitarian assistance.
There are many different ways of incorporating human rights in approaches to North Korea. I agree with many of the examples that Roberta cites. The purpose of my article was to identify some of the drawbacks to the “name and shame” approach and how a shift in perspective—starting where North Korea is—could in the short-term improve the livelihoods of North Koreans.