North Korean Leadership Transitions: A Strategic Revolving Door

Tracking North Korean leadership changes is rarely straightforward; deriving meaning from them, even more so. Notwithstanding, leadership changes are important because they reflect Kim Jong Un’s policy priorities and possibly even regime stability. This article summarizes key observations and analysis made by Michael Madden, Nonresident Fellow with 38 North at the Stimson Center, on 38 North’s affiliate North Korean Leadership Watch (NKLW) blog, from January 2025 to date.[1]

North Korea is undergoing significant elite reshuffling, reflected in the absences from public view of key figures such as Ri Il Hwan, director of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (CC) Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD), and Jo Yong Won, head of the WPK CC Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). Other notable changes include the appointment of Pak Thae Song, who is better-versed in external affairs than his predecessor Kim Tok Hun as cabinet premier, and the transition of former Minister and First Vice Minister of Defense Kim Jong Gwan as vice premier, a civilian post. Kim Jong Un’s strategy of rotating and disciplining top officials seems aimed at fighting corruption, reinforcing regime stability, adapting to external pressures, and maintaining Kim’s grip on power amid a shifting geopolitical landscape.

Notable Elite Absences and New Stars

The frequency of two high-level North Korean Party officials’ public appearances has dropped in recent months. Ri Il Hwan, the regime’s top propaganda official, has not been seen in public for more than 100 days. OGD Director Jo Yong Won has not been seen in public for over 50 days. These absences are unusual for officials of Ri’s and Jo’s rank and given how often they appeared in public in the past.

Ri Il Hwan’s lengthy absence suggests a disciplinary issue. If Ri had a medical issue and was in good standing with the Party, he would have at least attended the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) session and/or the Secretariat meeting, both held in January. The length of his absence is currently outside the short-term course at the Higher Party School (six to eight weeks), making it probable that he has been sent away for more extensive revolutionary education.

During the first quarter of 2025, Jo Yong Won’s standing and profile in the regime has declined. Jo, like Ri Il Hwan, did not attend the SPA session in January. Jo’s unusual absence from public view might be ascribed to conducting off-the-record project inspections to ensure efficiency and progress from lower-level officials in the run-up to two major WPK upcoming anniversaries—the 80th founding anniversary of the Party in October and the Ninth Party Congress, presumably to be held in January 2026.

Just as Ri Il Hwan and Jo Yong Won faded from the public eye, Ri Hi Yong and Kim Jae Ryong assumed greater public prominence, with Ri convening the Secretariat meeting in January and both Ri and Kim expanding their roles and importance among Kim Jong Un’s advisers. Ri Hi Yong was appointed as WPK Secretary for Cadres (personnel) Affairs and Central Inspection Commission (CIC) Chairman and Kim Jae Ryong as director of the WPK Discipline Inspection Department during a Party plenary meeting in December 2024.

It is possible that there is a division, even a rivalry, between Jo Yong Won against Ri Hi Yong and Kim Jae Ryong. Neither Ri nor Kim lasted longer than two years working under or alongside Jo Yong Won in the OGD. Kim Jae Ryong was OGD director from August 2020 to June 2022, during which he overlapped with Jo Yong Won, who was working as WPK Secretary for Organization. Ri Hi Yong was a senior OGD deputy director from 2020 until 2024. After approximately 18 months with Jo as OGD director, Ri was removed from office and did not seem to hold an active position.

Both Ri Hi Yong and Kim Jae Ryong currently hold positions in institutions intended to balance the OGD’s authority in the regime. With Ri and Kim leading those institutions, they seemed to be targeting administrative units and personnel directly under Jo’s OGD supervision.

Cabinet Reshuffles and Policy Priorities

North Korea conducted some notable shuffles in the Cabinet and ministries during the December 2024 Party plenary meeting. Pak Thae Song was appointed as DPRK cabinet premier. His appointment appears to be in part driven by the need for the cabinet premier to coordinate and manage North Korean cabinet ministries’ interactions with Russian counterparts. The DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership includes science and technology exchange with Russia. Pak has completed exchange and education agreements with foreign institutions and organizations in his prior capacity as WPK Secretary for Science and Education. The appointments of Kwon Song Hwan as minister of Natural Resources Development and Kim Yong Sik as Minister of Commerce were both likely connected to the treaty’s implementation.

The elevation of Kim Jong Gwan, former defense minister and first vice defense minister, to vice premier and alternate Political Bureau member, reflects a broader trend of senior military personnel migrating to civilian roles under Kim Jong Un’s reign. This migration serves both to reward loyal military figures and to tighten central control over key economic and infrastructure projects, including those with potential military applications.

Domestic and External Contexts

One persistent pattern in high-level North Korean personnel shuffles is Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on anti-corruption and discipline among elites. For example, it is likely that Ri Il Hwan was held responsible for the actions of his subordinates or social networks, even in the absence of direct involvement. This reflects a culture of collective responsibility and a willingness to use disciplinary measures both as punishment and as a tool for elite rotation.

The broader context suggests that high-level personnel shuffles are part of a deliberate strategy by Kim Jong Un to maintain elite cohesion and prevent the emergence of rival power centers. The ongoing transitions and the movement of military officials into civilian posts are intended to reinforce loyalty, ensure policy alignment, and adapt to changing external circumstances, including shifting relations with South Korea, the United States, and Russia.

It is also important to note that these personnel changes are taking place during a period of strategic uncertainty for North Korea. The external environment is in flux, with political instability in South Korea, a leadership transition in the United States, intensifying US-China strategic competition, and the future of the Russo-Ukraine war uncertain. As noted above, the DPRK-Russia partnership seems to be a key driver of some of the recent cabinet appointments, particularly in areas related to science, technology, and resource development.

Conclusion

Elite absences and reassignments, cabinet shuffles, and a renewed emphasis on discipline and anti-corruption all reflect Kim Jong Un’s efforts to adapt the regime’s decision-making structures to new challenges. These changes are driven by both internal imperatives, such as elite management and regime security, and external pressures, including evolving relations with Russia and the shifting international environment. As North Korea moves into 2025, the careful orchestration of personnel and policy underscores the regime’s enduring focus on stability, control, and strategic flexibility.

1. [1]

   These four articles are “Plenary Personnel,” January 4; “DID Cracks Down on Cadres,” February 10; “Ri Il Hwan, where you at?” February 12; and “Problem in the Control Tower,” April 15 (protected article).