Kim Jong Un is Watching Trump’s Ukraine Diplomacy With Interest
From March 23 to 25, US officials facilitated indirect negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to cement a short-term ceasefire in a war that crossed its four-year mark in February. The latest round of shuttle diplomacy occurred two weeks after Washington and Kyiv agreed to a 30-day truce on land, air and sea. Ideally, the pause in hostilities would not only freeze the conflict on the ground but provide the parties with an opportunity to begin addressing the systemic issues—Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expansionist ambitions; NATO’s enlargement toward Russian borders; Ukraine’s long-term relationship to Western political and security institutions—that have perpetuated the fighting. The Russians’ response was ambivalent; while Putin claimed he was sympathetic to the truce, he slow-walked the entire process by questioning how it would be enforced, who would determine violations and how violators would be penalized. After President Donald Trump ended his March 18 call with Putin, the 30-day truce was downgraded to a 30-day cessation of attacks on energy and infrastructure targets. Washington’s efforts to extend the ceasefire to the Black Sea is running into another roadblock from Putin, who is insisting on concrete sanctions relief before any pause.
To the average reader, all of this might seem like the boring, monotonous procedures of a diplomatic process that may not even succeed in the end. Yet it is unlikely North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his legion of experienced negotiators view it the same way. In fact, the opposite is likely the case—as the Trump administration engages with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the Kim regime will be watching the machinations from the sidelines and studying what strategy and tactics are most effective in eliciting concessions from Trump; whether resistance over time will compel Washington to discard its maximalist negotiating positions; and how committed Trump really is to diplomacy. South Korea is doing much the same, albeit for different reasons—depending on how much the US concedes to the Russians, how much pressure the Ukrainians feel during the course of negotiations and how Trump responds in the event of a diplomatic breakdown, policymakers in Seoul will either worry about what this all means for their own security or be partly reassured when time comes for their own negotiations with the Trump administration.
Kim’s History with Trump
Kim is not a novice when it comes to Trump, of course. During the Trump administration’s first term, Washington and Pyongyang spoke to one another directly at the highest level. After about a year of fiery, childish rhetoric, Trump, at the encouragement of then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in, did what no other US president before him dared to do—he authorized top-down summitry with the Kim family. Trump’s national security advisers at the time were deeply skeptical of the outreach because previous bouts of US-North Korea diplomacy had the tendency to fall apart over conflicting interests, an inability to pare US economic and political concessions with North Korean nuclear rollbacks, or even different interpretations of what was agreed.
Unlike his predecessors, however, Trump was impatient for a high-profile deal and was not all that interested in the nuts-and-bolts of nuclear disarmament. Kim, eager to get out from under a growing US economic sanctions regime and a tightening anti-North Korea consensus at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, gave the top-heavy diplomacy a chance. Although light on specifics, the June 12, 2018 joint statement published after the first Trump-Kim summit demonstrated a willingness by two historical enemies to explore whether rapprochement was possible.
But it did not take long for those hopeful early days to be extinguished by the wet blanket of self-interest and competing priorities. Despite some informal arrangements designed to grease the skids for a comprehensive agreement—Pyongyang suspended nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests, while Washington downgraded joint military exercises with South Korea—the talks eventually ran into the very same problem that stymied previous diplomatic efforts. The US, even under Trump, was not willing to countenance anything short of North Korea’s complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, a position Kim paid lip service to but in the end was unlikely to concede even if talks progressed. Unfortunately, the talks did not really start; Washington and Pyongyang were unable to agree on which side should initiate the first move and what each subsequent step was worth in terms of corresponding concessions. The Hanoi Summit broke without a result after Trump refused to accept Kim’s offer of demobilizing the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in return for the US lifting the most powerful sanctions. Trump tried to resurrect his personal relationship with Kim in June 2019 with a get-together along the Demilitarized Zone (which Trump crossed) four months after the summit in Hanoi collapsed in mutual disappointment at the inability to sign a deal. Yet Kim’s experiences in Hanoi, topped by the humiliating journey back home after he walked away empty-handed, taught him to view anything Trump said with a giant grain of salt. In October 2019, working-level talks died after only a few hours, with Kim Myong Gil, Pyongyang’s chief negotiator, blaming Washington for recycling the same old position and uttering the same boilerplate talking-points.
Second Time’s the Charm?
Despite the disappointing track record, there’s no doubt Trump would like to pick up where he left off by resuming contact with Kim—if the North Korean dictator lets him. Days after beginning his second term, Trump replied in the affirmative when Fox News’ Sean Hannity asked whether he would reach out to Kim again. The 2018-2019 time-period clearly had an impression on Trump, who continues to remind people that his supposed good relationship with Kim helped prevent a war from breaking out on the Korean Peninsula.
Judging by the North Korean response, the resumption of diplomacy Trump claims to want seems nowhere on the horizon. At the moment, Pyongyang has expressed no interest in buying what Trump is selling, although has not publicly ruled it out either. Part of the reason may be that North Korea’s prior diplomatic attempt with Trump proved more style than substance. Another part may be that rhetoric notwithstanding, the Trump administration’s Asia policy thus far has been conventional and virtually indistinguishable from the Biden administration’s. In February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed Washington’s “resolute commitment” to North Korea’s denuclearization as well as to the “ironclad commitments” to the defense of Japan and South Korea. On March 3, the USS Carl Vinson arrived in the South Korean port of Busan for joint military exercises. The fact that Trump sometimes rails against the inequities of the U.S.-South Korea alliance is cold comfort for Kim, who places more weight on actions than words.
Yet it would be a mistake to assume that US-North Korea relationship will be stuck in purgatory for the entirety of Trump’s term, for two reasons. First, Trump’s constant references over many months to the possibility of another discussion is not something Kim will ignore since it preserves his options. Second and related, Kim has proven himself to be pragmatic in his foreign relations and willing to upgrade (or downgrade) ties with foreign countries depending on the geopolitical circumstances of the time. If one lane is blocked, Kim adapts by searching for another. For example, it is difficult to envision Kim placing so many of his chips in the Russia basket if there was no war raging in Ukraine. That conflict has been a blessing for the North Koreans, who have exploited it to diversify the regime’s foreign relationships and lessen its relative isolation from the bad old days of 2017, when Beijing and Moscow were actually cooperating with Washington to penalize the North Korean economy for a barrage of WMD tests. At its core, Pyongyang’s strong partnership with Russia is about strategic considerations. Solidifying relations with another great power holds numerous benefits for the Kim regime—complicating US foreign policy in Northeast Asia, finding an alternative power-center to undermine China’s influence and scooping up the economic and political goodies associated with aiding Moscow in a war it regards as existential. A similar calculation drove Kim’s desire to participate in Trump’s diplomatic efforts nearly seven years earlier; cozying up to the US not only created the possibility of getting U and UN sanctions lifted but also forced Beijing, whose own relations with Pyongyang were faltering at the time, to seek to rebuild a rapport with Kim lest he sign a deal with Washington that was not in China’s interests.
How Ukraine Diplomacy can Impact the Korean Peninsula
In short, North Korea will keep all its options open because that’s what small powers do—they preserve their flexibility and adapt when the situation calls for it. The war in Ukraine was a building-block of a productive partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow, but Kim likely recognizes that the war’s end could slow this very same partnership down or even partially reverse it. In this scenario, Russia would no longer have urgent need for North Korean ammunition, missiles and personnel as it once did, translating into less leverage for Pyongyang and a heightened need to yet again reevaluate its foreign relations.
With Trump back in the White House, reviving nuclear diplomacy with the US could be a path for Kim if he’s pushed into a corner. Whether or not new negotiations happen with Washington will depend on a number of factors, including but not limited to the positions of the respective parties, who within the Trump administration is empowered to negotiate, whether North Korea’s still willing to engage in nuclear negotiations despite the numerous changes it has made to its own nuclear policy, and if it is, whether Washington and Pyongyang can find a suitable starting point down a long and tortured path toward denuclearization.
How Trump negotiates with Zelensky and Putin will be a factor in Kim’s mind as well. This might sound strange to some; after all, the war in Ukraine is separate and apart from the North Korean nuclear issue in terms of the main players involved and the history surrounding the dispute. Yet Trump’s behavior during peace talks, how he utilizes pressure to get what he wants and whether he proves to be successful at ending the war will help shape Kim’s perception about what a second term Trump can get done.
As it stands, the Trump administration is showing itself to be deadly serious about striking a peace settlement in Ukraine. Multiple rounds of diplomacy have already been conducted, with senior US officials sometimes meeting the Ukrainian and Russian representatives on the same day. Despite Moscow trying to slow things down, the talks have moved fast. Trump remains in a hurry to strike a comprehensive ceasefire by the Easter holiday on April 20.
More importantly, Trump has revealed himself to be someone who is not particularly concerned with the usual diplomatic niceties. Sticks and threats, not carrots and inducements, are his preferred tools of choice. This applies to partners as much as it does to adversaries. Zelensky, who appeared to take US military and political support for granted during the Biden administration, can no longer do so under Trump, who unleashed a rhetorical fusillade against the Ukrainian president during a February meeting in the Oval Office and suspended military and intelligence aid to Kyiv to coerce Zelensky into signing onto a truce. The pressure tactics worked. On March 2, the Ukrainians were still opposed to an immediate ceasefire. On March 11, a week after US aid was cut, Kyiv switched tact and catered to Trump’s position.
The full story has not been written. The ongoing diplomacy could go in any number of directions, and the North Koreans will be monitoring developments and tweaking their thinking depending on the outcome. If Trump essentially forces Zelensky into a settlement that caters to all or most of Russia’s terms, then Kim might make two conclusions: first, Trump is more interested in striking any deal rather than a good deal; second, if Trump can squeeze Ukraine into accepting a deal it does not want, then perhaps he could do precisely the same thing to South Korea if Seoul finds a U.S.-North Korea nuclear deal too weak. The South Koreans will be wondering the same thing for the opposite reason: if Trump can coerce Ukraine, what’s to say he would not coerce us too?
However, if the negotiations fall apart or Trump simply loses interest in the entire process, then Kim might think twice before authorizing an engagement policy with Washington. In the former, the North Koreans would be liable to view Trump as either a bad, inflexible or duplicitous negotiator, re-confirming an assumption about US policy that is already ingrained within the North Korean political elite. In the latter, Trump is at risk of being labeled by Kim as an unserious character more interested in the perception of historic dealmaking for domestic political purposes, not in crafting an actual agreement that resolves a long-standing security problem. Given his experience with the first Trump administration, it would not be surprising if this was Kim’s de-facto position today. South Korea will not be overjoyed if Ukraine peace talks fail but they may see a silver-lining in this scenario: that of an ally unwilling to throw a partner like Ukraine under the bus, even if it comes at the cost of a longer war or a failed diplomatic initiative.
Conclusion
Ultimately, all of these scenarios amount to guesswork at this early stage in the game. None of us know how patient Trump will be as negotiations proceed, whether the war will even end or how US policy will evolve (or not) if the diplomacy grinds down. But you can be certain that Kim Jong Un is not sitting still and waiting for answers—he is preparing for whatever answer arises and trying to determine how they impact his own policy with Washington.