North Korea’s Efforts to Attain De Facto Nuclear Weapon State Status and ROK-US Response Strategy

United States President Donald Trump has already made at least one statement referring to North Korea as a nuclear power, although has subsequently walked back those remarks. While China continues to call for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Russia appears to have abandoned that agenda, embracing its treaty ally’s nuclear status. This article examines what “de facto” recognition of a country’s nuclear status looks like and how North Korea is steadily making progress toward those milestones. To effectively counter North Korea’s strategic ambitions, it is imperative for the ROK (Republic of Korea)-US alliance to maintain a unified stance on the objective of North Korea’s denuclearization and to ensure the credible implementation of extended deterrence commitments in response to the security threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

Background

A de facto nuclear weapon state (DNWS) refers to a nuclear-armed country that is not officially recognized under the international nonproliferation regime (NPT) but has acquired diplomatic recognition from authoritative nuclear powers (P5 states) regarding its nuclear capability, survivability, and the perceived lack of necessity for sanctions. Such a state enjoys legal rights and obligations virtually identical to those of officially recognized nuclear weapon states (de jure NWS).

The legally recognized nuclear-armed states (de jure NWS) within the international community are those that had completed nuclear tests before the establishment of the NPT regime in 1970. Since the NPT does not apply retroactively, countries that developed nuclear weapons after 1970 are, in principle, not eligible for legal recognition as nuclear weapon states under international law. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel—despite developing nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework—have successfully secured the status of de facto nuclear weapon states. Recognizing that it cannot gain formal NWS status within the NPT framework, North Korea is expected to focus on securing de facto recognition, following a path similar to that of India and Pakistan.

Achieving DNWS status requires more than just nuclear capability; it necessitates technical proficiency, strategic deterrence, resilience to sanctions, and gradual diplomatic recognition. States that successfully navigate these four stages can transition from nuclear-capable entities to de facto recognized nuclear powers, securing a place in the global security order despite their non-NPT status.

Based on historical cases, four key ‘recognition thresholds’ define this pathway.[1]

First, the foundational requirement for DNWS status is the successful development of nuclear weapons and their integration with reliable delivery systems. This entails securing a sustainable supply of fissile material, mastering weaponization technology, and demonstrating operational readiness.

Second, a credible nuclear deterrent depends on the ability to withstand a preemptive strike and still retaliate. This involves developing survivable second-strike capabilities, such as hardened missile silos, mobile launch platforms, or submarine-based nuclear forces, ensuring the survivability of a state’s nuclear arsenal.

Third, states pursuing DNWS status should be resilient to sanctions and international pressure. India and Pakistan encountered severe international backlash after their 1998 nuclear tests but successfully endured these pressures, demonstrating their commitment to maintaining nuclear capabilities despite external opposition.

Lastly, the final and most critical stage is gaining diplomatic recognition from the international community. Over time, DNWS must secure diplomatic engagement from major powers and multilateral institutions, often through strategic partnerships, trade agreements, and nuclear-related deals. India, for instance, gained de facto recognition after signing the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, enabling civil nuclear cooperation despite India’s non-NPT status.

Challenges to North Korea’s DNWS Recognition

Despite achieving significant technological milestones in nuclear weapons development, Pyongyang has yet to overcome key barriers to international recognition, including the survivability of its second-strike capability, the mitigation of sanctions, and the establishment of diplomatic relations.

First, the survivability of North Korea’s nuclear force has not yet been definitively proven. It remains uncertain whether North Korea possesses a survivable second-strike capability against the US mainland. While Pyongyang appears to have successfully developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in terms of range, there is still no decisive evidence that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear warheads for missile delivery. North Korea has not yet conducted a real-distance test to verify its mastery of atmospheric reentry technology.

Second, North Korea remains largely isolated from the international community due to an extensive regime of international and bilateral sanctions imposed on the country due to its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons technologies. Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2270 in 2016, global sanctions on North Korea have shifted toward a comprehensive framework, significantly impacting its economy. Despite North Korea’s efforts to exploit global tensions—such as US-China strategic competition, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its deepening ties with Russia—to weaken the international sanctions regime, the US-led sanctions network appears to remain effective.

Third, North Korea has yet to secure diplomatic recognition from the United States. Since its first nuclear test in 2006, it has engaged in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, including the Six Party Talks and the 2018-2019 summits, to gain concessions in exchange for partial denuclearization. However, the international community, including Washington, has not provided Pyongyang with a credible pathway toward normalized diplomatic relations.

North Korea’s Strategic Approach to a De Facto Nuclear Weapon State

North Korea’s pursuit of de facto nuclear weapon state status follows a trajectory distinct from that of India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan achieved DNWS recognition from the United States by prioritizing regional deterrence, maintaining cooperative diplomatic relations, and demonstrating strategic significance to US interests. In contrast, North Korea’s direct threat to the United States, adversarial relations, and limited strategic value present significant obstacles to attaining comparable recognition. North Korea is likely to escalate its ability to strike the US mainland, induce fear, and pressure Washington into nuclear arms control talks as a means of solidifying its DNWS status.

To accomplish this plan, North Korea will probably pursue three primary objectives:

• Enhance its nuclear survivability: develop and demonstrate atmospheric reentry technology for its ICBMs and enhance the operational reliability of its tactical nuclear weapons to solidify its nuclear deterrence credibility and reinforce its escalation capabilities;
• Circumvent sanctions: exploit geopolitical tensions and cyber technologies to enhance its ability to evade sanctions enforcement; and
• Leverage diplomatic engagement for DNWS recognition: pressure the United States into arms control (versus full denuclearization) negotiations as a means of achieving de facto recognition.

To achieve these objectives, North Korea is likely to adopt a three-tiered strategic approach. First, North Korea will continue strengthening its alliance with Russia by providing military support to escape diplomatic isolation and sanctions, especially amid the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war and increasing US–China competition over Taiwan. In return for supporting Putin’s war, North Korea may be expecting to receive advanced military technologies, such as atmospheric reentry, guidance systems, and nuclear-powered submarines. As its relationship with Moscow deepens, Pyongyang may also seek to reengage China, aligning more closely with Beijing amid US-China tensions.

Second, North Korea will aim to create conditions conducive to negotiations with the United States that seek to secure concessions for potential limits or restrictions to North Korea’s nuclear development rather than toward full denuclearization. Given Trump’s diplomatic style, Pyongyang may seek to resume high-profile summits to secure these concessions, especially sanctions relief, effectively reinforcing its nuclear status.

Third, North Korea is likely to escalate military tensions on the Korean Peninsula as a coercive tool to shift negotiations toward short-term risk reduction and arms control measures rather than continued focus on full denuclearization. Pyongyang may amplify its rhetoric on “subjugating the whole territory of the south” and reinforce the perception of South Korea as a “nuclear hostage” to pressure Washington into concessions.[2]

US-ROK Strategic Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

In response to North Korea’s persistent efforts to establish itself as a de facto nuclear weapon state, the United States and South Korea should adhere to the following principles to uphold regional stability and nonproliferation norms.

First, the United States and South Korea must maintain a steadfast commitment to North Korea’s complete denuclearization. Recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and destabilize security in Northeast Asia. Fortunately, Trump’s new administration reaffirmed its resolute commitment to the “complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)” in accordance with the UNSCRs.

However, any shift in US nonproliferation policy would not only weaken South Korea’s strategic position, but also increase the risk of a further nuclear proliferation. Multiple surveys in South Korea already indicate broad public support for indigenous nuclear armament if North Korea retains its nuclear arsenal. For instance, an October 2024 survey by JoongAng Ilbo and the East Asia Institute (EAI), indicated 71.4 percent of South Koreans favored nuclear development under such circumstances, while 47.4 percent expressed mistrust in US extended deterrence. This trend suggests that existing measures, such as the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), extended deterrence, and nuclear operational guidelines, have not sufficiently alleviated public anxiety regarding North Korea’s nuclear threat.

Second, the denial of diplomatic recognition and economic relief is critical to preventing North Korea from consolidating its nuclear status. To uphold the international nonproliferation regime, maintaining stringent sanctions and blocking North Korea’s access to diplomatic normalization is paramount. However, sustaining a unified sanctions regime remains a persistent challenge. Historical precedents, such as the inconsistent enforcement of sanctions on India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea, illustrate the difficulties in maintaining long-term pressure on proliferating states. In parallel, engagement with North Korea must be approached with caution. Previous efforts, particularly the 2018-2019 US-North Korea negotiations under the Trump administration, demonstrated the risks of a top-down approach that sought a comprehensive resolution. The Trump-Kim summits exemplify how past nuclear negotiations with North Korea have significantly challenged South Korea’s security by allowing Pyongyang to bypass or selectively engage Seoul based on strategic considerations. These risks were further underscored by unilateral US decisions, such as the suspension of joint military exercises, which created unforeseen security vulnerabilities for South Korea. North Korea is likely to demand extensive political, military, and economic concessions—including the withdrawal of US forces, a suspension of joint military exercises, and economic incentives—in exchange for limited denuclearization measures. However, any future negotiation must be carefully structured to avoid unilateral concessions that could weaken the security framework of the Korean Peninsula.

Third, to counter North Korea’s efforts to establish itself as a de facto nuclear weapon state, the US and South Korea must prioritize deterrence and strategic stability. North Korea’s nuclear and missile advancements, coupled with deepening military ties with Russia, necessitate a robust deterrence posture that emphasizes credible and integrated extended deterrence. Additionally, the US, South Korea and Japan should coordinate diplomatic efforts to prevent formal recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status by Russia and China. A concerted strategy, incorporating diplomatic pressure, military preparedness, and economic measures, is essential to countering the evolving security dynamics and ensuring that North Korea does not gain international legitimacy as a nuclear state.

Conclusion

Responding effectively to North Korea’s pursuit of de facto nuclear weapon state status requires a robust US-ROK alliance. The Trump administration’s ambiguous policy on alliances and North Korea engagement could add uncertainty to a ‘denuclearization’ strategy. There is a significant risk that North Korea might seek DNWS status by either partially abandoning its nuclear arsenal in exchange for sanctions relief or by leveraging US-ROK extended deterrence as a bargaining chip to initiate nuclear arms control with the United States. Either scenario could seriously undermine South Korea’s security interests. Therefore, any engagement with North Korea must be built on a foundation of a strong alliance and mutual trust between the United States and South Korea, thereby reducing security uncertainties. Ultimately, addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge calls for a comprehensive strategy that harnesses the full spectrum of national power while ensuring that the safety and well-being of the alliance remain paramount.

1. [1]

   Rohan Mishira, “A Nuclear Recognition Threshold,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 120, No. 4 (May 2020), p. 1069.

2. [2]

   “Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee,” Korean Central News Agency of DPRK (December 31, 2023).